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Merge pull request #7973 from VersatusHPC/feat/secureboot-ipxe
feat(ipxe): boot a UEFI node with Secure Boot on
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@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Both features are asked for, because the two are separate. ``secure-boot`` names
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A hypervisor that ships no such firmware refuses the domain with ``Unable to find 'efi' firmware that is compatible with the current configuration``, rather than starting the node on a firmware that verifies nothing.
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``firmware:efi`` keeps its meaning and asks for no feature, so a node that asks only for UEFI takes the firmware its hypervisor prefers.
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``firmware:efi`` asks for UEFI with Secure Boot off. Without that, libvirt picks the descriptor of highest priority that fits the node, and the first x86_64 descriptor of an EL 10 host is ``30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json``, so a node that asked only for UEFI starts with Secure Boot on and refuses its own unsigned kernel.
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Known limits of the upstream loader
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-----------------------------------
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@@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ sub default_storagemodel {
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move to scsi.
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efi-secureboot also sets secureboot, which guest_os turns into the requirement
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libvirt reads. efi alone states no requirement, so libvirt takes the descriptor of
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highest priority that fits the guest, and that order belongs to the hypervisor.
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libvirt reads. efi alone asks for no Secure Boot, which firmware_features states as a
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feature: libvirt otherwise takes the descriptor of highest priority that fits the
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guest, and that order belongs to the hypervisor.
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Arguments:
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$guest_arch - nodetype.arch of the node, or undef
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$hyp_cpumodel - the cpumodel of the hypervisor, or undef
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@@ -588,6 +589,15 @@ sub guest_os {
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libvirt reads <loader secure='yes'/> as the secure-boot feature alone, and picks the
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descriptor of highest priority that carries it. A host that ships the 40- descriptor
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and not the 30- one satisfies that domain with an empty key store.
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A guest that asks for UEFI and no secureboot states secure-boot off. Without that
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feature libvirt takes the descriptor of highest priority again, and the 30- one is
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first on an EL 10 host, so the guest starts with Secure Boot on and refuses its own
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unsigned kernel. It states nothing about enrolled-keys, which only a firmware with
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secure-boot reads.
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A guest with no firmware runs no firmware autoselection, and libvirt refuses a
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<firmware> feature there, so it asks for none.
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Arguments:
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$profile - the hash reference from guest_arch_profile, or undef
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Returns:
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@@ -598,7 +608,8 @@ sub guest_os {
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#-------------------------------------------------------
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sub firmware_features {
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my ($profile) = @_;
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return [] unless ref($profile) eq 'HASH' and $profile->{secureboot};
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return [] unless ref($profile) eq 'HASH' and defined $profile->{firmware};
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return [ { name => 'secure-boot', enabled => 'no' } ] unless $profile->{secureboot};
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return [
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{ name => 'secure-boot', enabled => 'yes' },
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{ name => 'enrolled-keys', enabled => 'yes' },
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@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@
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# An x86_64 KVM guest asks libvirt for UEFI with Secure Boot on with vm.othersettings
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# "firmware:efi-secureboot".
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#
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# firmware:efi alone states no requirement about Secure Boot. libvirt then takes the firmware
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# descriptor of highest priority that fits the guest, and that order is host policy: the same
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# node boots with Secure Boot on on one hypervisor and off on another, and the domain reports
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# neither. A node that must boot signed binaries has to say so, so that a hypervisor without a
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# Secure Boot firmware refuses the domain instead of starting it unverified.
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# A node states what it wants, in both directions. firmware:efi alone states no requirement,
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# and libvirt then takes the firmware descriptor of highest priority that fits the guest. That
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# order is host policy: on an EL 10 host the first x86_64 descriptor is
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# 30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json, so a node that asked only for UEFI boots with Secure Boot
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# on and keys enrolled, and its unsigned kernel is refused. So firmware:efi asks for
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# secure-boot off, and firmware:efi-secureboot asks for it on.
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#
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# <loader secure='yes'/> is not that requirement on its own. libvirt reads it as the secure-boot
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# feature, and a firmware with secure-boot and an empty key store boots an unsigned binary. The
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@@ -65,13 +66,14 @@ is( $sb->{disk_model}, 'scsi', 'and its disks take the scsi bus, because q35 has
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is( $sb_os->{bios}->{useserial}, 'yes',
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'and it keeps <bios useserial="yes"/>, so its boot still reaches the serial console' );
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# firmware:efi must keep stating nothing about Secure Boot. A site that asked only for UEFI
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# gets the firmware its hypervisor prefers, as it did before.
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# firmware:efi asks for UEFI and for no Secure Boot. <loader secure='yes'/> is the requirement
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# for Secure Boot on, so it stays off the <os> of that node; the requirement for Secure Boot off
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# is a <firmware> feature, which guest_os cannot carry.
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my $uefi_os = os_of( node_profile('firmware:efi') );
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is( $uefi_os->{firmware}, 'efi', 'firmware:efi still asks for UEFI' );
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is( $uefi_os->{loader}, undef, 'and states no Secure Boot requirement' );
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is( $uefi_os->{loader}, undef, 'and does not ask for a firmware that verifies what it boots' );
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is( os_of( node_profile(undef) )->{loader},
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undef, 'a node that asks for no firmware states no Secure Boot requirement either' );
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undef, 'a node that asks for no firmware does not ask for one either' );
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# A value libvirt cannot select is refused by name, and the refusal names both values a node
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# may ask for. A typo must not leave the node on a firmware it did not ask for.
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@@ -135,11 +137,19 @@ is_deeply(
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[ { name => 'secure-boot', enabled => 'yes' }, { name => 'enrolled-keys', enabled => 'yes' } ],
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'a Secure Boot node asks for secure-boot and for enrolled-keys'
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);
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is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features( node_profile('firmware:efi') ),
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[], 'firmware:efi asks for no firmware feature' );
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is_deeply(
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xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features( node_profile('firmware:efi') ),
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[ { name => 'secure-boot', enabled => 'no' } ],
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'firmware:efi asks for a firmware that verifies nothing, and says nothing about the keys'
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);
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is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features( { firmware => 'efi', secureboot => 0 } ),
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[ { name => 'secure-boot', enabled => 'no' } ],
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'an aarch64 or riscv64 profile, which always asks for UEFI, states Secure Boot off as well' );
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is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features( node_profile(undef) ),
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[], 'and neither does a node that asks for no firmware' );
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is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features(undef), [], 'and neither does an undefined profile' );
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[], 'a node that asks for no firmware asks for no feature, because libvirt reads a feature only with firmware autoselection' );
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is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features( { firmware => undef, secureboot => 1 } ),
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[], 'and so does a profile that asks for Secure Boot without UEFI, which libvirt cannot select' );
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is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features(undef), [], 'an undefined profile asks for none' );
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# The domain as kvm.pm writes it: the <os> of guest_os, then the features.
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sub domain_of {
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@@ -170,15 +180,22 @@ is( XML::LibXML->load_xml( string => $sb_domain )->findnodes('/domain/os/loader'
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->getAttribute('secure'),
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'yes', 'and keeps <loader secure="yes"/> beside the features' );
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# A node that asked only for UEFI gets no <firmware>, so it keeps taking the descriptor its
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# hypervisor prefers.
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foreach my $othersettings ( 'firmware:efi', undef ) {
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my $name = defined($othersettings) ? $othersettings : 'no firmware';
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my $domain = domain_of( node_profile($othersettings) );
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is_deeply(
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[ XML::LibXML->load_xml( string => $domain )->findnodes('/domain/os/firmware') ],
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[], "$name states no firmware feature" );
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}
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# A node that asked only for UEFI states Secure Boot off, so the firmware it gets does not
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# depend on the order the hypervisor keeps its descriptors in.
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my $uefi_domain = domain_of( node_profile('firmware:efi') );
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is( feature_enabled( $uefi_domain, 'secure-boot' ),
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'no', 'the domain of a UEFI node asks for a firmware that verifies nothing' );
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is( feature_enabled( $uefi_domain, 'enrolled-keys' ),
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undef, 'and states nothing about the keys, which only a Secure Boot firmware reads' );
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is( XML::LibXML->load_xml( string => $uefi_domain )->findnodes('/domain/os/loader')->[0],
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undef, 'and keeps <loader secure="yes"/> off the domain' );
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# A BIOS node takes no <firmware> element. libvirt reads a feature only where firmware
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# autoselection runs, and refuses a domain that states one with no firmware attribute on <os>.
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is_deeply(
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[ XML::LibXML->load_xml( string => domain_of( node_profile(undef) ) )
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->findnodes('/domain/os/firmware') ],
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[], 'a node that asks for no firmware states no firmware feature' );
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is( xCAT::KVMUtils::add_firmware_features( "<domain type='kvm'><os/></domain>", [] ),
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"<domain type='kvm'><os/></domain>",
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