2
0
mirror of https://github.com/xcat2/xcat-core.git synced 2026-11-20 09:22:17 +00:00

fix(xcat-test): the check on the image domain's authority cannot fail

The check that holds the whole security property of the split matched
`^allow (\w+) file_type:\w+ \w+;$` -- one unbraced permission and nothing
else. Every braced rule and every interface call passed it, so a grant of
filesystem-wide authority to xcat_t would not have been caught.

The pattern now reads both forms, and the named interfaces that grant the
same thing are asserted per domain: files_manage_all_files,
files_relabel_all_files, auth_manage_shadow, auth_relabel_shadow and
seutil_manage_file_contexts belong to xcat_image_t and not to xcat_t. One
check records what xcat_t does keep, and why.

Verified against the policy: a braced `allow xcat_t file_type:file { write
relabelto };` fails 1 check, and `files_relabel_all_files(xcat_t)` fails 2.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Hilst
2026-10-15 15:33:39 -03:00
parent 4e35eebfbd
commit dccc5ad202
+22 -4
View File
@@ -271,11 +271,29 @@ is_deeply([ grep { fc_type($_) eq 'xcat_image_exec_t' } sort keys %fc ],
# THE SECURITY PROPERTY OF THE SPLIT. The image build writes and relabels files
# of every type, because it creates an operating system tree. The daemon that
# listens on the network must not hold that authority.
my @wide = $te =~ /^allow (\w+) file_type:\w+ \w+;$/mg;
# The first form of this check matched only `allow X file_type:class perm;`
# with a single unbraced permission, so every braced rule and every interface
# call passed it. It is the whole security property of the split, so it now
# reads both forms and names the interfaces that would grant the same thing.
my @wide = $te =~ /^allow (\w+) file_type:\w+ [{\w]/mg;
is_deeply([ sort(List::Util::uniq(@wide)) ], [ 'xcat_image_t' ],
'only the image domain may manage and relabel every file type');
unlike($te, qr/^files_(manage|relabel)_all_files\(xcat_t\)$/m,
'the daemon domain gets no filesystem-wide grant by interface either');
'only the image domain may reach every file type directly');
# The daemon domain may not relabel a security type, and may not manage one at
# all. Those two are what keeps /etc/selinux, the keytabs and the audit
# configuration of the management node out of reach of the network daemon.
foreach my $iface (qw(files_manage_all_files files_relabel_all_files
auth_manage_shadow auth_relabel_shadow seutil_manage_file_contexts)) {
unlike($te, qr/^\Q$iface\E\(xcat_t\)$/m, "$iface is not given to xcat_t");
like($te, qr/^\Q$iface\E\(xcat_image_t\)$/m, "... and $iface is the image domain's")
if $te =~ /^\Q$iface\E\(/m;
}
# What xcat_t does keep, and why, so the next reader does not take the split for
# more than it is: packimage and liteimg are symlinks to xcatclientnnr, so their
# tree work runs in the daemon.
like($te, qr/^files_manage_non_security_files\(xcat_t\)$/m,
'xcat_t still manages non-security files, for packimage');
# A management node or a service node with the targeted policy installs the module.
foreach my $pkg (qw(xCAT-server xCATsn)) {