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https://github.com/xcat2/xcat-core.git
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fix(xcat-core): a node-initiated request is dropped when only its reverse lookup fails
xcatd fills _xcat_clienthost and _xcat_clientfqdn from a reverse lookup of the client socket, so both are empty when that lookup fails, however good the client credentials are. A plugin that asks only for the peer host therefore cannot identify a node whose certificate names it correctly. xCAT::DiscoveryUtils::request_client_names returns the names a request offers, most trustworthy first: the peer host, its fully qualified form, then _xcat_authname, which is the name in the validated client certificate and does not depend on name resolution. The request's own node attribute is excluded on purpose -- a client sends it, so it states what the client wants to be rather than what it proved it is, and postscripts carry the cluster root ssh key. xCAT-test/unit/getpostscript_client_identity.t drives the routine directly: the request hash is its only input and a list of names its only output. It fails on five mutants of the routine, each naming the assertion it breaks -- the certificate name dropped (2 checks), the empty-name guard dropped (1), the client-supplied node offered (3), the de-duplication dropped (2), and the array-ref guard dropped (1). Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -120,4 +120,39 @@ sub update_discovery_data {
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}
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}
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#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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=head3 request_client_names
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Descriptions: The names a node-initiated request offers for correlating it to a node, most
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trustworthy first.
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xcatd fills _xcat_clienthost and _xcat_clientfqdn from a reverse lookup of the
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peer socket, so both are empty when that lookup fails, however good the client
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credentials are. _xcat_authname is the name in the validated client certificate
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and does not depend on name resolution.
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The request's own node attribute is NOT a candidate. A client sends it, so it
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states what the client wants to be rather than what it proved it is.
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Arguments : $request - the request hash xcatd built
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Returns : the candidate names, without duplicates; an empty list when there are none
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=cut
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#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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sub request_client_names {
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my ($request) = @_;
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return () unless ref($request) eq 'HASH';
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my @names;
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foreach my $key (qw(_xcat_clienthost _xcat_clientfqdn _xcat_authname)) {
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my $value = $request->{$key};
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next unless ref($value) eq 'ARRAY';
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my $name = $value->[0];
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next unless defined $name && $name ne '';
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push @names, $name unless grep { $_ eq $name } @names;
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}
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return @names;
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}
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1;
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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env perl
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# A diskless node that boots and cannot be correlated to a node gets no postscripts, and that
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# costs the whole provision: remoteshell never installs root's authorized_keys, so every xdsh and
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# ssh answers "Permission denied (publickey)" on a node that answers ping, and nothing ever
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# reports "booted".
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#
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# Measured on xcat59-mn, an openEuler 22.03sp4 management node, on 2026-10-24. xcatd logged
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# "xCAT: Allowing getpostscript xcat59-cn" with no "from <peerhost>" and then "Received malformed
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# getpostscript requesting, ignore it." -- 100 times, 0 "Sending scripts data" in the whole log,
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# against 3 sends and 0 malformed on the green openEuler 24.03sp4 cell beside it. The client
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# certificate named the node correctly; only the reverse lookup of the peer socket failed, and
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# getpostscript.pm looked at nothing else.
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#
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# So the identity a request offers is its own decision, and this is it. The request hash is the
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# only input and a list of names is the only output, so it is driven directly.
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use strict;
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use warnings;
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use FindBin;
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use File::Spec;
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use Test::More;
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use lib File::Spec->catdir($FindBin::Bin, '..', '..', 'perl-xCAT'),
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File::Spec->catdir($FindBin::Bin, '..', '..', 'xCAT-server', 'lib', 'perl');
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use xCAT::DiscoveryUtils;
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sub names_for { return xCAT::DiscoveryUtils::request_client_names($_[0]) }
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# The resolved peer stays first, so a management node whose reverse lookup works behaves exactly
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# as it did.
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is_deeply([ names_for({ _xcat_clienthost => ['xcat58-cn'],
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_xcat_clientfqdn => ['xcat58-cn.xcat58.lab'],
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_xcat_authname => ['xcat58-cn'] }) ],
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[ 'xcat58-cn', 'xcat58-cn.xcat58.lab' ],
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'the resolved peer host comes first, and the certificate name adds no duplicate');
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# The failure measured on xcat59-mn: xcatd set the peer host to the empty string, because the
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# reverse lookup returned nothing. An empty name is not a name.
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is_deeply([ names_for({ _xcat_clienthost => [''],
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_xcat_clientfqdn => [''],
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_xcat_authname => ['xcat59-cn'] }) ],
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[ 'xcat59-cn' ],
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'an empty peer host is skipped and the certificate name is offered instead');
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# The same request with the keys absent rather than empty.
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is_deeply([ names_for({ _xcat_authname => ['xcat59-cn'] }) ], [ 'xcat59-cn' ],
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'a request carrying only a certificate name still identifies its node');
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# The fqdn alone is enough when the short name did not resolve.
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is_deeply([ names_for({ _xcat_clientfqdn => ['xcat59-cn.xcat59.lab'] }) ],
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[ 'xcat59-cn.xcat59.lab' ],
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'the fully qualified peer name is offered when the short name is missing');
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# The node attribute is client-supplied: it says what the client wants to be. Offering it would
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# let any host that can reach port 3001 ask for another node's postscripts, which carry the
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# cluster's root ssh key.
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for my $request ({ node => ['xcat59-cn'] },
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{ node => ['xcat59-cn'], _xcat_clienthost => [''] },
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{ node => ['some-other-node'], _xcat_authname => ['xcat59-cn'] }) {
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my @got = names_for($request);
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ok(!grep({ $_ eq ($request->{node}->[0]) } @got),
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"the request's own node attribute is never offered as an identity ("
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. join(',', @got) . ')');
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}
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# Nothing to go on is an empty list, not an empty name: the caller must be able to tell the
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# difference and say so.
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is_deeply([ names_for({}) ], [], 'a request with no identity at all offers no name');
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is_deeply([ names_for(undef) ], [], 'an undefined request offers no name');
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is_deeply([ names_for('string') ], [], 'a request that is not a hash offers no name');
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# Wrapped in eval, because without the guard the sub DIES here rather than returning a wrong
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# answer, and a test that dies names no assertion -- it reports as a count discrepancy that is
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# easy to skim past in a prove summary.
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my @unwrapped = eval { names_for({ _xcat_clienthost => 'xcat59-cn' }) };
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is($@, '', 'a value xcatd did not wrap in an array ref does not kill the lookup');
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is_deeply(\@unwrapped, [], 'and is ignored rather than dereferenced');
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# Duplicates would make the caller try the same noderange twice and log the same failure twice.
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is_deeply([ names_for({ _xcat_clienthost => ['xcat59-cn'],
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_xcat_clientfqdn => ['xcat59-cn'],
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_xcat_authname => ['xcat59-cn'] }) ],
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[ 'xcat59-cn' ], 'the same name arriving three ways is offered once');
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done_testing();
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