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xcat-core/docs/source/advanced/selinux/index.rst
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Daniel Hilst e9f27f139b fix(xcat-core): the documented repair relabels before the guest exclusions exist
The SELinux page carried the repair in two blocks. The first mapped the
published artifacts and ran restorecon over the image root. The second mapped
the publication directory and excluded both guest trees. An operator with
site.installdir=/srv/xcat-install who reads the page in order therefore
relabels before any mapping covers that tree, and rootimg/etc/shadow resolves to
var_t. The exclusion added afterwards keeps the var_t it finds, because it only
stops the next relabel from changing the label again.

The order also cost the artifacts. file_contexts keeps the expressions in the
order they are read and the last one that matches a path wins, so the exclusions
of the second block beat the artifact mappings of the first. Where the image
root carries a rootimg component in the middle, the exclusion matches the
artifacts as well, and the five expressions with a wildcard, the initrds and the
packed images, resolve <<none>>. kernel and hypervisor carry no wildcard and win
either way, which is why the defect showed on a subset.

The page is now one sequence: the publication directory, both guest exclusions,
the artifact mappings, then one restorecon. It says what each step orders and
why.

xCAT-test/native/selinux_image_repair.t passes 381 of 381 checks on this
sequence and fails 47 on the order of the parent commit. selinux_docs.t fails 3
of 30 on the parent commit.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-23 00:56:50 -03:00

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ReStructuredText

SELinux
=======
xCAT runs on a management node that has SELinux in enforcing mode. An xCAT
installation does not change the SELinux mode of the machine.
Scope
-----
The policy module covers the management node. It defines the domain of ``xcatd``,
of the client commands and of the image build, and it labels the files xCAT
owns. A service node and a compute node get no xCAT domain.
They get a mode. ``noderes.selinux`` on the node, then the ``noderes.selinux``
of its groups, then ``site.selinux`` decides the mode that the installer of a
diskful compute or service node configures. A stateless or statelite node gets
``selinux=0``, because its root carries no label. See
:doc:`SELinux </advanced/security/selinux>` for the table and for the switches.
The two domains
---------------
``xcatd`` and the xCAT client commands run in ``xcat_t``. The image build runs
in ``xcat_image_t``, because it creates a complete operating system tree and
therefore writes and relabels files of every type. The ``xCAT-selinux`` package
labels the files each domain is entered through:
=========================================== =======================
File Type
=========================================== =======================
/opt/xcat/sbin/xcatd ``xcatd_exec_t``
/opt/xcat/bin/xcatclient ``xcat_client_exec_t``
/opt/xcat/bin/xcatclientnnr ``xcat_client_exec_t``
/opt/xcat/bin/xcatDBcmds ``xcat_client_exec_t``
/opt/xcat/bin/genimage ``xcat_client_exec_t``
/opt/xcat/share/xcat/netboot/<os>/genimage ``xcat_image_exec_t``
/opt/xcat/share/xcat/netboot/<os>/geninitrd ``xcat_image_exec_t``
=========================================== =======================
``xcatd`` runs the per-OS ``genimage`` through a shell, so the build enters
``xcat_image_t`` from ``xcat_t``. An administrator who runs ``genimage``
directly enters it the same way.
What each domain holds
----------------------
``xcat_image_t`` may create, write and relabel a file of any type, including the
security types a package installs inside the image: ``/etc/selinux``, the audit
configuration and the keytabs of the image. The kernel cannot tell a path inside
the image from the same type on the management node, so this is the broadest
grant in the module and the reason the build has a domain of its own.
``xcat_t`` keeps what the daemon needs: its sockets and the ``xcatd`` port,
``/install``, ``/tftpboot``, the configuration of the services it drives, the
credentials under ``/etc/xcat``, and the ``service`` class for the units it
restarts. It also manages and relabels non-security files, because ``packimage``
and ``liteimg`` are symlinks to ``xcatclientnnr`` and their work runs inside
``xcatd``. What it never gets is the security types.
Services xCAT starts itself
---------------------------
xCAT starts ``in.tftpd`` without a systemd unit. The module transitions it to
the stock ``tftpd_t``, so the TFTP server does not serve UDP 69 with the
authority of the management domain. ``chronyd``, which ``setupntp`` runs, reaches
``chronyd_t`` the same way.
systemd enters ``xcat_t`` on the ``xcatd`` script, so the ``ExecStart`` of the
unit must name ``xcatd`` and not a shell. 115 command names are symlinks to
``xcatclient`` or ``xcatclientnnr``, and each one enters the domain through the
file it points to. ``/usr/sbin/xcatd`` is a symlink, and ``execve`` resolves it,
so the context belongs to the file in ``/opt/xcat``.
A rootimg component in the middle of an image root is ambiguous, because
``rootimgdir`` is any path under ``/install``. The file contexts leave the
published kernel and initrd of such an image root out of the relabel, so that
they cannot take the guest labels with them. A published ``common`` or
``overlay`` directory of an image root called ``rootimg`` is left out for the
same reason: its path is also the path of a ``common`` or ``overlay``
directory at the root of a guest tree.
A path the file contexts leave out keeps the label it has. ``restorecon`` does
not change it and does not clear it. ``genimage`` writes into an image root
that ``restorecon`` already made ``public_content_t``, and a new file inherits
the type of its directory, so the kernel is ``public_content_t`` and ``httpd``
serves it. Netboot works.
The cost is a published artifact of such an image root that already carries
another type, from before the package was installed. ``restorecon`` over the
publication directory cannot repair it, with or without ``-F``, because the
path has no context to apply. Give it one.
``site.installdir`` selects the publication directory. Add the mappings in this
order, and relabel once at the end::
installdir=$(lsdef -t site -i installdir -c | sed 's/^.*=//; s:/*$::')
imgroot=$installdir/netboot/rootimg/rhels9/x86_64/compute
# 1. The publication directory, when site.installdir is not /install. The
# packaged mappings name /install and cover no other directory.
semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "$installdir(/.*)?"
# 2. Both guest trees, before anything relabels them.
semanage fcontext -a -t '<<none>>' "$installdir(/.*)?/rootimg(/.*)?"
semanage fcontext -a -t '<<none>>' "$installdir(/.*)?/rootimg-statelite(/.*)?"
# 3. The published artifacts of the one image root, after the exclusions.
for name in kernel hypervisor 'initrd[^/]*' 'rootimg\.[^/]*' \
'rootimg-statelite\.[^/]*' 'rootimgtree\.[^/]*' \
'litefile\.csv' 'common\.filelist'; do
semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t -f f "$imgroot/$name"
done
# 4. One relabel, with every mapping in place.
restorecon -R -v "$installdir"
Steps 1 and 2 come first because a relabel before them writes a generic type
over the guest labels. With ``site.installdir=/srv/xcat-install`` and no mapping
for that tree, ``rootimg/etc/shadow`` resolves to ``var_t``. A mapping added
after such a relabel only stops the next one from changing what is already
wrong.
Step 3 comes after step 2 because ``file_contexts`` keeps the expressions in the
order they are read, and the last one that matches a path wins.
``$installdir(/.*)?/rootimg(/.*)?`` matches ``$imgroot`` itself when the image
root carries a ``rootimg`` component in the middle, so it matches the published
artifacts too. Read after the exclusions, each artifact mapping wins against
them. Read before, the artifacts resolve to ``<<none>>``. An expression with no
wildcard, such as ``kernel``, wins either way, so the defect shows on the
initrds and the packed images alone.
Step 4 runs once. Each expression in step 3 names one regular file directly
below the image root, so no path in ``$imgroot/rootimg`` or
``$imgroot/rootimg-statelite`` matches one, and ``restorecon`` leaves every file
in both guest trees alone. Under the standard ``/install`` the packaged
mappings already carry steps 1 and 2, and ``file_contexts.local`` is read after
the packaged file, so step 3 still wins.
Do not repair a label with ``chcon``, and do not map the image root as a tree.
``chcon`` writes a type that no mapping selects, so the next relabel of a path
that has a mapping reverts it, and a recursive ``chcon`` relabels both guest
trees as well. A tree mapping over the image root relabels them through
``restorecon`` instead.
A mapping is persistent, so a later recursive relabel and a policy upgrade both
keep the result. ``xCAT-test/native/selinux_image_repair.t`` starts with the
wrong type on every published artifact and valid types in both guest trees,
runs the four steps in order, and reads the labels back after a recursive
relabel and after a reinstall of the module. It does that for a moved
``installdir`` whose image root also carries a ``rootimg`` component in the
middle, which is the layout that needs every step.
The unit holds ``/opt/xcat`` as the default prefix, and ``%post`` writes
``/etc/xcat/xcatroot.env`` with the prefix of the installation, which the unit
reads after that default. The file contexts name ``/opt/xcat``, so a package
relocated with ``rpm --prefix`` starts in its own tree but needs its own file
context entries before the entrypoints reach ``xcat_t``.
Read the domain of the running daemon with::
ps -o label= -p "$(cat /run/xcatd.pid)"
ps -eo label,args | grep '[x]catd:'
The domains are permissive
--------------------------
The policy source declares ``permissive xcat_t;`` and
``permissive xcat_image_t;``. The host policy stays
enforcing, and the kernel records each access that ``xcat_t`` makes outside the
rules rather than refusing it. The CI collects those records, and each rule the
module gains comes from one of them. A later release removes the declaration
and the domain becomes enforcing.
List the permissive domains of the loaded policy with::
semodule -l | grep -x xcat
seinfo --permissive
A transition to another domain is not covered by a permissive declaration.
``tftpd_t``, ``chronyd_t`` and the stock domains enforce their own rules.
A denial that the kernel enforced carries ``permissive=0``. On a management node
of this version, only such a record reports a refused access::
ausearch --input-logs -m AVC,USER_AVC -ts today | grep permissive=0
Commands run by a user
----------------------
Targeted policy gives root the ``unconfined_t`` domain, and the module
transitions from there into ``xcat_t``. A confined user domain, such as
``staff_t``, gets no transition: it would leave its own confinement for a
permissive domain. A command run from such a domain stays in it, and SELinux
still applies the rules of that domain.
SELinux does not replace the file permissions. A user who cannot read
``/etc/xcat`` cannot read it in ``xcat_t`` either.
The access the module grants other services
-------------------------------------------
``xcat_t`` is one part of the module. The rest grants the access that the
services around xCAT need:
* ``/install`` is ``public_content_t``, so ``httpd`` serves it. Each ``rootimg``
tree is left out of the relabel, because it keeps the labels of its own
operating system.
* ``httpd`` reads and maps the ``/tftpboot`` files that ``xcat.conf`` serves.
* ``xcatws.cgi`` connects to the ``xcatd`` port.
* ``rsync`` reads ``/etc/shadow`` and writes a copy it created at mode 0000.
* ``useradd`` and ``groupadd`` read the ``rootimg`` ``/var/run`` symlink, which
the rpm scriptlets of a ``genimage`` build need.
Reading denials
---------------
``ausearch`` without ``--input-logs`` reported nothing on an AlmaLinux 10 node
whose log held 1032 denials, because audit 4.0.3 reads the journal rather than
the file ``auditd.conf`` names. Pass ``--input-logs``, or read the log file,
before you conclude that a machine is clean.
The kernel also drops audit records printed before ``auditd`` starts, at
``printk_ratelimit_burst`` and with no notice. Boot with
``sysctl.kernel.printk_ratelimit=0`` to see that window whole. A count taken
without it is a lower bound.