Extract secret_in_request, secret_in_response and the secret sets from
xcatd.pm, because the classifier and the finalizer consult them. Cover
the authentication key, the privacy key and the snmpc site value reads
as sensitive, the token, prodkey and site table dumps as sensitive, the
nodels expansion of a secret table as sensitive, the lsvm directory
listing as sensitive, and the implicit lsdef attribute listing as
redacted. Keep a plain site value, a benign table,
a benign object listing and a group named like a table as not
sensitive. Assert that the daemon redacts each request segment alone.
Extracts the three command-log response subs and drives them. It checks the
request classification, the redaction of a bare passwd value, a secret split
across callbacks in either order, the password-content fallback, that a benign
response is kept, and that the finalizer preserves an earlier command's response
on a shared connection. It fails hard if a sub cannot be extracted.
Vinícius Ferrão