The chapter rules out ppc64le, aarch64 and riscv64, and says nothing about the
distribution. The shim chain is UEFI and distribution independent, so a reader
concludes that any distribution xCAT installs boots with Secure Boot on, and nothing
in the chapter contradicts it.
Operator decision, 2026-10-22: Secure Boot is Enterprise Linux and x86_64 for 2.20.
State it, and say what is measured rather than what is possible -- the mechanism does
work elsewhere, and that is exactly why the support claim has to be explicit.
The CI side carries the same scope: the Secure Boot case is named by the EL x86_64
leaves only, in xcat-core-ci-cd cells.tsv.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
Two statements about this branch are narrower than the code.
Commit 1edcddab8 says a node with a machine type xCAT cannot judge
"failed at mkvm". firmware_machine_error is returned by build_xmldesc,
and makedom calls build_xmldesc for a node whose domain is not yet built,
so the refusal also reaches the rpower boot of that node. The POD of
firmware_machine_error now names both callers.
The Secure Boot section of the ipxe guide did not name
firmware:efi-secureboot at all. It now says what mkvm asks libvirt for,
why both the secure-boot feature and enrolled-keys are asked for, and
what a hypervisor without such a firmware answers.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
The Secure Boot chapter described the shim that each kind of node uses
and did not say which of them boots. A reader took the MOK paragraph for
a supported procedure, and an operator configuring discovery found
nothing about Secure Boot at all.
The chapter now states what the path supports: a node with netboot=ipxe
boots the kernel of a distribution with Secure Boot on, for a disk
installation and for a netboot image. Genesis requires Secure Boot off on
the node, because xCAT-genesis-base ships its kernel unsigned and a shim
verifies a kernel only against the signature database of the firmware or
a key in the MOK list. That covers discovery, the Genesis shell and the
standby and runcmd destinies. The section on clients without a node
definition names the same requirement and links to it.
A site may still sign the Genesis kernel with its own key and enroll it
with mokutil. xCAT ships no key and no signature.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
The bats stub returned one exit code for every "chdef netboot=", and the
helper calls chdef twice: once to set the method to ipxe, and once to put
the saved method back. With the stub failing both, "a netboot method that
cannot be put back fails the case" passed on the FORWARD failure, so
removing restore_rc=1 from the restoring branch left all 18 tests green.
The test named a defect it could not detect.
The stub now counts its netboot calls and fails the one the test names,
so the forward chdef succeeds. The test asserts that forward call is in
the call log, and matches the message only the restoring branch prints.
Removing restore_rc=1 now fails test 8 and no other.
docs/source/advanced/ipxe/index.rst said both methods run the same boot
scripts, which stopped being true when the shim line became conditional
on the method. It now says what differs, and states that Secure Boot
reaches netboot=ipxe only: xnba.efi is unsigned, and grub2 nodes are out
of scope.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
This PR adds a shim to the UEFI boot scripts of netboot=ipxe nodes, so a node
with Secure Boot on reaches its kernel.
The firmware signature database does not hold the keys of a Linux
distribution. A UEFI node with netboot=ipxe loads snponly-shim.efi and
snponly.efi, both signed, and then stops at the kernel with "Verification
failed: Security Policy Violation".
xCAT::SecureBoot::shim_url_path names a shim for one node. The shim of the
install source comes first, because its vendor certificate signs the kernel of
its own distribution. copycds keeps the names of the DVD, so the module tries
EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI, EFI/BOOT/bootx64.efi and EFI/boot/bootx64.efi: EL and
openEuler ship the first, openSUSE the second and Ubuntu the third. When no
install source carries a shim, the module names the shim of ipxe-xcat, which
verifies a kernel that a MOK key signs.
xnba.pm writes the shim line after imgload in the UEFI script of an ipxe node,
and mknb.pm writes it in the UEFI discovery scripts. iPXE fetches the shim only
when it cannot load the kernel itself, so a node with Secure Boot off reads no
shim. netboot=xnba is unchanged: no key signs xnba.efi.
The elilo and ESXi paths and the Genesis kernel stay unsigned, and the iPXE
documentation now says so. The validation matrix gets a row for a UEFI install,
a netboot image and discovery with Secure Boot on.
secureboot_ipxe_node_shim.t and secureboot_genesis_shim.t drive nodeset and
mknb into a scratch TFTP root. Four assertions of ten and two of seven fail
without this change.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
A new page describes the ipxe and xnba netboot methods: the files of the
upstream loader, UEFI Secure Boot through the shim and its limits, the
client test, the loader of nodes without a definition, the move of
nodes to the ipxe method and back, and the known limits of the upstream
loader.
The node guide, the noderes, node, group and nodeset pages list the ipxe
method, and the value lists mark xnba deprecated. The examples that
define an x86 node use netboot=ipxe. The mixed cluster and uninstall
guides name ipxe-xcat, and the DHCP validation matrix gets the iPXE
loader rows, Secure Boot included.