From 94d2ce2cd595c4172e03daef0ae97be16826ba67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 10:11:49 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] fix(kvm): a Secure Boot domain can start on a firmware with
no enrolled keys
guest_os stated alone for a node with
vm.othersettings firmware:efi-secureboot. libvirt reads that element as
the secure-boot feature, and a firmware with secure-boot and an empty key
store boots an unsigned binary. The two x86_64 descriptors of an EL 10
host name the same OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd and differ in the nvram template,
OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd against OVMF_VARS.fd, so only descriptor priority
picked the one that holds keys. Commit 772b2c656 of this branch says that
element selects the descriptor with enrolled keys. It does not.
firmware_features names secure-boot and enrolled-keys for a Secure Boot
guest, and add_firmware_features writes them into the of the domain.
guest_os cannot carry the element: the firmware attribute of and the
child of are one key of one hash for XMLout, and the
attribute is the one that starts the selection. firmware:efi asks for no
feature and is unchanged.
Measured with libvirt 11.10.0 on an x86_64 host, with the enrolled
descriptor masked for one connection: the old XML starts on OVMF_VARS.fd
with enrolled-keys resolved to no, and the new XML is refused with
"Unable to find 'efi' firmware that is compatible with the current
configuration". virt-xml-validate accepts the new XML.
kvm_secureboot_firmware.t covers the features and the element. Two
mutations turn it red: dropping enrolled-keys from firmware_features, and
making add_firmware_features return its argument.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Hilst <392820+dhilst@users.noreply.github.com>
---
perl-xCAT/xCAT/KVMUtils.pm | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
xCAT-server/lib/xcat/plugins/kvm.pm | 3 +-
xCAT-test/unit/kvm_secureboot_firmware.t | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/perl-xCAT/xCAT/KVMUtils.pm b/perl-xCAT/xCAT/KVMUtils.pm
index 737dac1bf5..6214737cb4 100644
--- a/perl-xCAT/xCAT/KVMUtils.pm
+++ b/perl-xCAT/xCAT/KVMUtils.pm
@@ -528,11 +528,12 @@ sub firmware_machine_error {
A ppc64le hypervisor gets no . A profile without bios drops it too.
A machine type from vm.othersettings replaces the machine type of the profile.
- A profile with secureboot states . libvirt reads it while it
- selects the firmware and keeps only the descriptors that carry secure-boot, so a
- hypervisor with no such firmware refuses the domain. Without the element the guest
- takes whichever firmware the hypervisor prefers, and the domain says nothing about
- whether that firmware verifies what it boots.
+ A profile with secureboot states . libvirt keeps only the
+ descriptors that carry the secure-boot feature while it selects the firmware, so a
+ hypervisor with no such firmware refuses the domain. The element says nothing about
+ the UEFI keys, so firmware_features asks for enrolled-keys beside it. Without the
+ element the guest takes whichever firmware the hypervisor prefers, and the domain
+ says nothing about whether that firmware verifies what it boots.
Arguments:
$profile - the hash reference from guest_arch_profile
%args - hyp_cpumodel: the cpumodel of the hypervisor; bootorder: vm.bootorder of the
@@ -568,6 +569,79 @@ sub guest_os {
#-------------------------------------------------------
+=head3 firmware_features
+
+ Descriptions:
+ The firmware autoselection features of one guest, in the form states them.
+
+ A guest with secureboot asks for secure-boot and for enrolled-keys. secure-boot names
+ a firmware that can verify what it boots. It does not name the UEFI keys that decide
+ what passes, and a firmware with secure-boot and no enrolled keys boots an unsigned
+ binary. The two x86_64 descriptors of an EL 10 host show the difference:
+ 30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json and 40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json name the same
+ OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd and differ in the nvram template, OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd against
+ OVMF_VARS.fd. Only the first template holds keys.
+
+ libvirt reads as the secure-boot feature alone, and picks the
+ descriptor of highest priority that carries it. A host that ships the 40- descriptor
+ and not the 30- one satisfies that domain with an empty key store.
+ Arguments:
+ $profile - the hash reference from guest_arch_profile, or undef
+ Returns:
+ an array reference of { name, enabled } pairs, empty when the guest asks for none
+
+=cut
+
+#-------------------------------------------------------
+sub firmware_features {
+ my ($profile) = @_;
+ return [] unless ref($profile) eq 'HASH' and $profile->{secureboot};
+ return [
+ { name => 'secure-boot', enabled => 'yes' },
+ { name => 'enrolled-keys', enabled => 'yes' },
+ ];
+}
+
+#-------------------------------------------------------
+
+=head3 add_firmware_features
+
+ Descriptions:
+ Add with the features firmware_features names to the of one domain.
+
+ guest_os cannot carry this element. The firmware attribute of and the
+ child of are one key of one hash for XMLout, which writes a scalar as an
+ attribute and a reference as an element, so the hash holds one of the two. The
+ attribute is the one that starts the firmware selection.
+ Arguments:
+ $xml - the domain XML
+ $features - the array reference from firmware_features
+ Returns:
+ the new domain XML, or $xml when the guest asks for no feature
+
+=cut
+
+#-------------------------------------------------------
+sub add_firmware_features {
+ my ($xml, $features) = @_;
+ return $xml unless ref($features) eq 'ARRAY' and scalar(@$features);
+ require XML::LibXML;
+ my $domdesc = XML::LibXML->new()->parse_string($xml);
+ my ($os) = $domdesc->findnodes('/domain/os');
+ return $xml unless $os;
+ my $element = $domdesc->createElement('firmware');
+ foreach my $feature (@$features) {
+ my $child = $domdesc->createElement('feature');
+ $child->setAttribute('enabled', $feature->{enabled});
+ $child->setAttribute('name', $feature->{name});
+ $element->appendChild($child);
+ }
+ $os->appendChild($element);
+ return $domdesc->toString();
+}
+
+#-------------------------------------------------------
+
=head3 clock_offset
Descriptions:
diff --git a/xCAT-server/lib/xcat/plugins/kvm.pm b/xCAT-server/lib/xcat/plugins/kvm.pm
index c7da387e00..e0e70bff6e 100644
--- a/xCAT-server/lib/xcat/plugins/kvm.pm
+++ b/xCAT-server/lib/xcat/plugins/kvm.pm
@@ -889,7 +889,8 @@ sub build_xmldesc {
$xtree{devices}->{console}->{type} = 'pty';
$xtree{devices}->{console}->{target}->{port} = '1';
- return XMLout(\%xtree, RootName => "domain");
+ return xCAT::KVMUtils::add_firmware_features(XMLout(\%xtree, RootName => "domain"),
+ xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features($profile));
}
sub refresh_vm {
diff --git a/xCAT-test/unit/kvm_secureboot_firmware.t b/xCAT-test/unit/kvm_secureboot_firmware.t
index 5ebe5e2ff6..58de679aaf 100644
--- a/xCAT-test/unit/kvm_secureboot_firmware.t
+++ b/xCAT-test/unit/kvm_secureboot_firmware.t
@@ -8,16 +8,26 @@
# neither. A node that must boot signed binaries has to say so, so that a hypervisor without a
# Secure Boot firmware refuses the domain instead of starting it unverified.
#
-# is the requirement libvirt reads during firmware selection. Measured
-# with libvirt 11.10.0 on rome01: with that element resolves to
-# OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd and , and the same domain with
-# resolves to OVMF_CODE.fd.
+# is not that requirement on its own. libvirt reads it as the secure-boot
+# feature, and a firmware with secure-boot and an empty key store boots an unsigned binary. The
+# two x86_64 descriptors of an EL 10 host name the same OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd and differ in the
+# nvram template: 30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json takes OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd, which holds the
+# keys, and 40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json takes OVMF_VARS.fd, which does not. Only descriptor
+# priority picks the first one, and priority is host policy.
+#
+# So the domain asks for enrolled-keys as well. Measured with libvirt 11.10.0 on rome01, with
+# the 30- descriptor masked for one connection: the domain that states
+# alone starts on OVMF_VARS.fd with enrolled-keys resolved to no, and the domain that asks for
+# enrolled-keys is refused with "Unable to find 'efi' firmware that is compatible with the
+# current configuration".
use strict;
use warnings;
use FindBin;
use lib "$FindBin::Bin/../../perl-xCAT";
use Test::More;
+use XML::LibXML;
+use XML::Simple qw(XMLout);
require xCAT::KVMUtils;
@@ -105,4 +115,65 @@ is( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_machine_error( undef, 'pc', 'x86_64', 'cn1' ),
is( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_machine_error( 'efi', 'virt', 'riscv64', 'cn1' ),
undef, 'the machine types of another architecture are not judged here' );
+# carries the features libvirt filters the descriptors by. It is not in the hash
+# guest_os returns: the firmware attribute of and the child of are one key
+# of one hash for XMLout, and the attribute is the one that starts the selection. So
+# add_firmware_features adds the element to the domain XMLout wrote, which is what kvm.pm does.
+my $features = xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features($sb);
+is_deeply(
+ $features,
+ [ { name => 'secure-boot', enabled => 'yes' }, { name => 'enrolled-keys', enabled => 'yes' } ],
+ 'a Secure Boot node asks for secure-boot and for enrolled-keys'
+);
+is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features( node_profile('firmware:efi') ),
+ [], 'firmware:efi asks for no firmware feature' );
+is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features( node_profile(undef) ),
+ [], 'and neither does a node that asks for no firmware' );
+is_deeply( xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features(undef), [], 'and neither does an undefined profile' );
+
+# The domain as kvm.pm writes it: the of guest_os, then the features.
+sub domain_of {
+ my ($profile) = @_;
+ my $os = XMLout( os_of($profile), RootName => 'os' );
+ $os =~ s/^<\?xml[^>]*\?>\s*//;
+ return xCAT::KVMUtils::add_firmware_features( "\n$os\n\n",
+ xCAT::KVMUtils::firmware_features($profile) );
+}
+
+sub feature_enabled {
+ my ( $xml, $name ) = @_;
+ my ($node) =
+ XML::LibXML->load_xml( string => $xml )
+ ->findnodes("/domain/os/firmware/feature[\@name='$name']");
+ return defined($node) ? $node->getAttribute('enabled') : undef;
+}
+
+my $sb_domain = domain_of($sb);
+is( feature_enabled( $sb_domain, 'enrolled-keys' ),
+ 'yes', 'the domain of a Secure Boot node asks for a firmware whose keys are enrolled' );
+is( feature_enabled( $sb_domain, 'secure-boot' ),
+ 'yes', 'and for one that verifies what it boots' );
+is( XML::LibXML->load_xml( string => $sb_domain )->findnodes('/domain/os')->[0]
+ ->getAttribute('firmware'),
+ 'efi', 'and it keeps firmware="efi" on , which is what starts the firmware selection' );
+is( XML::LibXML->load_xml( string => $sb_domain )->findnodes('/domain/os/loader')->[0]
+ ->getAttribute('secure'),
+ 'yes', 'and keeps beside the features' );
+
+# A node that asked only for UEFI gets no , so it keeps taking the descriptor its
+# hypervisor prefers.
+foreach my $othersettings ( 'firmware:efi', undef ) {
+ my $name = defined($othersettings) ? $othersettings : 'no firmware';
+ my $domain = domain_of( node_profile($othersettings) );
+ is_deeply(
+ [ XML::LibXML->load_xml( string => $domain )->findnodes('/domain/os/firmware') ],
+ [], "$name states no firmware feature" );
+}
+
+is( xCAT::KVMUtils::add_firmware_features( "", [] ),
+ "",
+ 'a domain that asks for no feature is returned unchanged, not re-serialised' );
+is( xCAT::KVMUtils::add_firmware_features( "", $features ),
+ "", 'a domain with no is returned unchanged' );
+
done_testing();